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Abstract—Software Defined Networking (SDN) has been re-
cently introduced as a new communication paradigm in com-
puter networks. By separating the control plane from the data
plane and entrusting packet forwarding to straightforward
switches, SDN makes it possible to deploy and run networks
which are more flexible to manage and easier to configure. This
paper describes a set of extensions for the INET framework,
which allow researchers and network designers to simulate
SDN architectures and evaluate their performance and security
at design time. Together with performance evaluation and
design optimization of SDN networks, our extensions enable
the simulation of SDN-based anomaly detection and mitigation
techniques, as well as the quantitative evaluation of cyber-
physical attacks and their impact on the network and applica-
tion. This work is an ongoing research activity, and we plan to
propose it for an official contribution to the INET framework.
Index Terms—SDN; Security; OMNeT++; INET; Simulation
1. Introduction
In the recent years, Software Defined Networking (SDN)
[11] has been more and more adopted as a new network
communication paradigm [6]. Unlike the traditional Internet
model, SDN separates the actual forwarding of network
packets (data plane) from the management of network traffic
and routes (control plane). In principle, a centralized SDN
controller determines how to handle different traffic seg-
ments, namely flows, and installs related forwarding rules
on simple switch devices responsible for the actual packet
forwarding. The SDN controller and the switches rely on
a common set of APIs and control messages to interact
with each other, so preventing interoperability issues among
devices from different vendors. To this end, OpenFlow [7]
has become the de-facto protocol implemented in SDN con-
trollers and switches. By entrusting all the monitoring and
decision processes to the SDN controller, SDN considerably
simplifies the management of large-scale networks. Also, it
results in a faster and more flexible re-configuration of traffic
patterns, if compared with traditional network architectures.
To deploy SDN networks that operate according to ex-
pectations, it is vital that, far before deployment, network
designers can quantitatively evaluate: i) network and com-
munication performance; ii) effects and impact of security
attacks against the network; and iii) accuracy and effective-
ness of anomaly detection systems [8]. To this end, network
simulation represents a convenient and helpful tool to adopt,
since it can be infeasible to perform the same evaluations in
real, large-scale, networks. Especially for evaluating SDN-
based monitoring systems and the impact of security attacks,
it is convenient to perform such assessments at design
time, so not interfering with the regular operations of real
networks. On the other hand, an analytical approach is often
infeasible, unless oversimplifying assumptions are made.
So far, there have been only a few contributions for
simulation of SDN networks. Mininet is a common tool to
perform functional testing of emulated networks based on
OpenFlow [4]. However, it focuses on real-time functional
testing rather than on the simulation and evaluation of
arbitrary network scenarios. The network simulator NS-3
provides an OpenFlow simulation model [2]. However, the
SDN controller is not modeled as an external entity, and thus
it is not possible to quantitatively evaluate the impact of the
control channel or to consider multiple switches connected
to the same SDN controller. More recently, [5] has proposed
the implementation of OpenFlow components integrated in
the INET framework [1], based on the network simulation
environment OMNeT++ [3]. However, it models only the
basic flow establishment between OpenFlow switches and
a basic SDN controller. Also, it implements only flow-
matching rules solely based on MAC address fields.
In this paper, we describe a set of extensions for the
INET framework that enable performance and security eval-
uation in SDN networks. In particular, we have extended
the model initially proposed in [5], in order to support
additional OpenFlow messages and enable the processing of
network packets based on flow-matching rules of arbitrary
complexity. Also, we have provided support for SDN-based
monitoring systems, according to which the SDN controller:
i) collects flow statistics from the connected switches; ii) an-
alyzes collected samples in order to detect possible anoma-
lies; and iii) possibly determines and disseminates policies to
mitigate anomalies and restore normal operating conditions
in the network. Finally, we have enabled the simulation
of effects of security attacks in SDN network scenarios.
To this end, we consider the INET-based attack simulation
framework SEA++ that we previously described in [10]
and whose functionalities have been adapted to support
attack simulation in SDN networks. Intuitively, the user
can describe different cyber-physical attacks by means of
a high-level attack specification language, without altering
the actual implementation of any of the INET software com-
ponents. Events that reproduce the effects of the described
attacks are injected at runtime during the simulation experi-
ments. The approach devoted to reproducing and evaluating
security attacks is not strictly related to SDN, i.e. it can in
principle be reused together with any network architecture
and scenario sopported by the INET framework.
We believe that our extended simulation tool allows
researchers and network designers to effectively and conve-
niently evaluate SDN architectures at design time, both in
attack-free scenarios and in case different security attacks
are performed. In particular, it makes it possible to evaluate
an SDN scenario in terms of: i) network and communication
performance in an attack-free case; ii) effectiveness and
reactiveness of SDN-based monitoring systems; iii) quan-
titative effects of security attacks, as to how attacks affect
performance indicators in the same network scenario; and iv)
quantitative effectiveness of security countermeasures. This
work is an ongoing research activity, and we plan to propose
it for an official contribution to the INET framework. Our
extended simulation framework is currently under develop-
ment, and the source code is available at [9].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews
Software Defined Networking. Section 3 describes our ex-
tensions to the INET framework which support SDN, Open-
Flow, SDN-based monitoring systems, and simulation of
effects of security attacks. In Section 4, we evaluate a simple
Denial of Service attack against a server host, and present
preliminary results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper
and anticipates future works and research directions.
2. Packet forwarding in SDN
SDN essentially relies on the separation of data plane
and control plane. In particular, the data plane is entrusted
to simple switches that forward network packets according
to stored flows and related matching rules. The control
plane is entrusted to a centralized SDN controller, which
establishes packet flows and installs them on the switches.
The SDN controller and switches interact with each other
through dedicated control messages and APIs, such as the
ones provided by the common OpenFlow protocol [7].
Figure 1 shows an example of flow establishment and
packet delivery. First, host A sends a packet P to host B
(step 1). Upon receiving packet P, the switch looks for a
possible match between P and the flows installed in its
flow table (step 2). If no matching rule to process packet
P is found, the switch asks the SDN controller for further
instructions (step 3). Then, the SDN controller creates a
new flow (step 4), and installs the related matching rule
and actions on the switch (step 5). That is, it instructs the
switch that all packets coming from Port 1, with IP source
address 192.168.0.1 and IP destination address 192.168.0.2
Figure 1: Flow establishment and packet forwarding.
must be sent out over Port 2. After that, the switch installs
the new flow on its flow table, as a pair of matching fields
and actions to be performend on any packet matching with
that flow (step 6). If more output ports are available, the
switch is initially instructed to send out this first packet P
over all ports different than Port 1. Later on, upon receiving
a reply packet on a specific port, the switch contacts again
the SDN controller, which modifies the action associated to
that flow by specifying the exact outgoing port to consider.
Finally, the switch forwards packet P to host B (step 7).
3. SDN extensions for INET
This section overviews our extensions for the INET
framework. Section 3.1 presents the support for flow es-
tablishment and packet forwarding based on OpenFlow.
Section 3.2 presents the support for SDN-based monitoring
systems. Section 3.3 presents the support for the evaluation
of security attacks. Our extended simulation framework is
under development, and the source code is available at [9].
3.1. Support to SDN architecture and OpenFlow
SDN relies on two fundamental elements: i) the SDN
controller and switches; and ii) the exchange of OpenFlow
messages to establish flows and install them on the switches.
We have considered the model initially proposed in [5],
that provides a number of essential OpenFlow messages
and the implementation of the switches and SDN controller
nodes. In particular, the SDN controller is essentially a host
running an application which relies on a typical TCP/IP
stack and models a specific controller behavior. Instead,
the switches are modelled as a new type of node, where a
control plane running a TCP application on top of a TCP/IP
stack interacts with multiple data plane instances, by means
of the OMNeT++ signal concept. Both the SDN controller
and the switches rely on a specific time model to take into
account the processing time of real OpenFlow units.
We extended the model implemented in [5], provid-
ing additional functionalities that enable the evaluation of
Figure 2: Overview of a SDN controller and switch.
SDN-based monitoring systems and impact of security at-
tacks (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3). In particular, we pro-
vided additional support to: i) exchange and process the
OpenFlow control messages OFPT STATS REQUEST and
OFPT STATS REPLY between the SDN controller and the
switches for collection of flow statistics; ii) exchange and
process the OpenFlow messages OFPT FLOW REMOVED
sent by the switches to the SDN controller to report expired
flows; and iii) allow the switches to perform the matching
of incoming packets with installed flows based on arbitrary
packet fields (rather than on MAC addresses only).
Figure 2 shows the architectural overview of the SDN
controller (a) and a SDN switch (b). The elements coloured
in red have been extended in our implementation, in order to
enable statistic collection and network monitoring, as well
as the reporting of flow expiration and the arbitrary-complex
matching of packets with flows installed on switches. The
SDN controller is simply modelled as a generic host, run-
ning a traditional TCP/IP stack. Then, a specific Controller
application is responsible for the establishment of flows, and
their installation, update and revocation on the switches. Of
course, the Controller application can be entrusted with ad-
ditional services, such as network monitoring and anomaly
detection (see Section 3.2). Policies, algorithms and param-
eters according to which the Controller application behaves
are specified in the Controller behavior module.
The switch is composed of two different segments,
sharing the same Flow table. That is, the Control plane is
also modelled as a typical TPC/IP stack, through which a
Flow processing application can exchange control messages
with the SDN controller. Instead, the Data plane is a set
of minimal communication stacks, each one relying on a
dedicated MAC interface. Then, all MAC interfaces are con-
nected to the same Forwarding application, which forwards
packets from an incoming MAC interface to an outgoing
MAC interface, according to the flow-matching rules and
related forwarding actions stored in the Flow table. If no
matching is produced, the Forwarding application asks the
Flow processing application to contact the SDN controller
and establish a new flow, before proceeding.
The following OpenFlow messages are considered in
order to support the establishment and updates of flows.
• OFPT PACKET IN. Sent by the switch to the SDN con-
troller, when a packet is received and no match is produced.
• OFPT PACKET OUT. Sent by the SDN controller to a
switch, specifying to send a packet over a specific interface.
• OFPT FLOW MOD. Sent by the SDN controller to a
switch, specifying to install/modify a flow in its flow table.
• OFPT FLOW REMOVED. Sent by a switch to the SDN
controller, notifying that a flow in the flow table has expired.
3.2. SDN-based monitoring systems
The SDN controller can run additional application
services to perform security monitoring of the network.
This practically relies on three modules, namely flow
statistic collection, anomaly detection, and anomaly mit-
igation. That is, the SDN controller periodically sends
an OFPT STATS REQUEST OpenFlow message to the
switches, according to a pre-configured polling interval. The
switches reply with an OFPT STATS REPLY OpenFlow
message, reporting the packet matches and the accesses to
their flow tables occurred during the current time window.
Given this information, the SDN controller can analyze the
collected statistics, and look for possible anomalies or on-
going attacks, such as Denial of Service (DoS) or wormhole
propagation. The actual anomaly detection process can rely
on several different techniques, e.g. machine learning [15],
data mining [14], or entropy based algorithms [12] [13].
When the SDN controller identifies traffic anomalies or
ongoing attacks, it performs mitigating actions to limit or
neutralize their impact. That is, the SDN controller sends
OFPT FLOW MOD messages to specific switches, to in-
stall or update flows in their flow tables. Such flows and
related policies aim at blocking malicious traffic, e.g. by
dropping or caching packets that are addressed to presumed
victim hosts or coming from suspected attack sources.
3.3. Simulation of security attacks
Our extensions allow network designers to quantitatively
evaluate the impact and effects of security attacks against
SDN networks, i.e. how attacks affect performance indica-
tors with respect to the same scenario in the attack-free case.
This makes it possible to rank different attacks according to
their severity, and hence to easier select effective counter-
measures to adopt. Rather than executing security attacks by
implementing their actual performance, we reproduce their
effects against the network and applications. Evaluation of
security attacks relies on two fundamental components, i.e.
a high-level Attack Specification Language and an Attack
Simulation Engine, described in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3.
We previously presented an earlier version of such
components as part of the INET-based attack simulation
framework SEA++ [10], and adapted their functionalities to
support attack simulation in SDN networks. Note that the
approach adopted to reproduce and evaluate security attacks
is not strictly related to SDN, i.e. it can in principle be reused
for any network architecture sopported by INET. At the
same time, our extended simulation tool makes it possible
to evaluate the impact of security attacks that specifically
consider switches as actual attack victims (e.g. injection of
fake flows to install) or compromised units contributing to
the attack execution (e.g. through packet dropping or repli-
cation). Our implementation activity is currently focused on
enabling the evaluation of such attacks involving switches.
3.3.1. Attack description. The Attack Specification Lan-
guage (ASL) allows the user to describe attacks to be
evaluated, in terms of their final effects. That is, the user as-
sumes that attacks can be successfully performed, regardless
how an adversary can specifically mount and execute them.
Then, the user describes attacks as sequence of events that
atomically take place during the network simulation. To this
end, the ASL provides a collection of primitives organized
into two sets, i.e. node primitives and message primitives.
Node primitives account for physical attacks against
network nodes. A physical attack is composed by a single
node primitive. The following node primitives are available:
• destroy(nodeID, t) - Remove node ’nodeID’ from the
network at time ’t’, after which it cannot take part to
network communication any longer.
• move(nodeID, t, x, y, z) - Change the current position of
node ’nodeID’ to a new position {x,y,z} at time ’t’.
Message primitives account for cyber attacks and
describe actions on network packets. Packet fields are
addressed by means of the dot notation packet.layer.field.
The following node primitives are available:
• drop(pkt) - Discards the packet ’pkt’.
• create(pkt, fld, content, ...) - Creates a new packet
’pkt’ and fill its field ’fld’ with ’content’. It is possible
to specify the content of multiple fields through a single
invocation.
• clone(srcPkt, dstPkt) - Produces a perfect copy ’dstPkt’
of the packet ’srcPkt’.
• change(pkt, fld, newContent) - Writes ’newContent’
into the field ’fld’ of packet ’pkt’.
• send(pkt, d) - Schedules the transmission of a packet
’pkt’ produced by ’clone()’ or ’create()’, after a delay ’d’.
• retrieve(pkt, fld, var) - Assigns the content of the field
’fld’ of packet ’pkt’ to the variable ’var’.
• put(pkt, dstNodes, TX | RX, updateStats, d) - Inserts
the packet ’pkt’ either in the TX or RX buffer of all nodes
in the ’dstNodes’ list, after a delay ’d’.
The ASL provides statements to specify conditional
attacks, i.e. lists of events described through message prim-
itives that occur on a declared list of nodes if a condition is
evaluated as TRUE. That is, as a general example:
from T nodes = <list of nodes> do {
filter(<condition>) <list of events>
}
Also, it is possible to specify unconditional at-
tacks, i.e. list of attack events described through mes-
sage primitives, and reproduced on a periodical fashion
or upon the occurrence of specific conditions evaluated
by network nodes at runtime. For instance, the statement
Figure 3: Architecture of the Attack Simulation Engine.
from T every P do {<list of events>} speci-
fies that the list of events takes place periodically on the
declared list of nodes, since time T and with period P.
3.3.2. Attack Simulation Engine. After having described
the attacks to be evaluated, the user simply runs a simulation
campaign on the enhanced INET framework, in order to
evaluate the impact and effects of the described attacks. To
this end, the Attack Simulation Engine (ASE) considers net-
work nodes as implemented by an Enchanced Network Node
module. The latter is in turn composed of: i) an Application
module possibly including different sub-modules modelling
the actual node application(s); ii) an arbitrarily complex
collection of protocols composing the communication stack;
and, finally iii) a Local Event Processor (LEP) module.
Notice that all such modules but LEP can be off-the-shelf.
The LEP module manages the attack events and oper-
ates transparently with respect to the other components of
the Enhanced Network Node module. Specifically, the LEP
module intercepts incoming and outgoing network packets
traveling through a node’s communication stack, acting as
gate-bypass between each pair of INET modules implement-
ing the different communication layers. Then, depending on
the considered attacks to be evaluated, it can inspect and
alter packets’ content, inject new packets, or even discard
intercepted ones. Finally, the LEP module can also alter the
node’s behavior at different layers, change its position in
space, or even neutralize the node by making it inactive.
To address the presence of multiple network nodes and
enable the simulation of complex attacks, we instantiate an
Enhanced Network Node module for each network node,
and a single Global Event Processor (GEP) module that
connects all the Enhanced Network Node modules with
one another. The GEP module is separately connected with
every LEP module, so allowing them to synchronize and
communicate with one another in order to implement more
complex, possibly distributed, security attacks. Finally, the
LEP and GEP modules handle packets at different commu-
nication layers and conveniently access their header fields
by means of the OMNeT++ descriptor classes.
Figure 3 shows the overall architecture of the ASE, with
reference to two interconnected network nodes. Our exten-
sions integrate the Local Event Processor and Global Event
Processor modules highlighted in green within the INET
framework, in order to correctly manage simulation events
and network packets. This requires particular attention for
the SDN switches, to maintain the separation between the
Control plane and the Data plane, and to correctly manage
the multiple MAC interfaces (see Figure 2(b)).
Note that the ASE consists in additional components
integrated within the INET framework to support the pro-
cessing of attack events. That is, we do not fundamentally
modify INET as to the handling and scheduling of simu-
lation events, and we do not modify any of the available
applications, communication protocols, or physical models.
Most important, the user is not required to implement or
customize any component of the simulation platform.
3.3.3. Injection of attack events. The attack description
based on ASL is converted into a XML configuration file
by means of a Python Attack Specification Interpreter, and
then provided as input to INET upon simulation startup.
Such configuration file is composed of three different
sections, i.e a first part listing all the specified physical
attacks, a second part listing all the specified conditional
attacks, and a final third part listing all the specified
unconditional attacks. At simulation startup, the ASE
parses the XML configuration file and proceeds as follows.
For each node n involved in at least one attack, the ASE:
• Creates one list LPn, each element of which includes the
description of one physical attack involving node n. The
list elements are cronologically ordered according to the
respective attack’s occurrence time.
• Creates one list LCn, each element of which includes
the description of one conditional attack involving node n.
The list elements are cronologically ordered according to
the respective attack’s starting time.
• Creates one list LUn, each element of which includes
the description of one unconditional attack involving node
n. The list elements are cronologically ordered according
to the respective attack’s starting time.
After that, the ASE starts a number of timers, each one
associated to a specified attack. That is, for each node n
involved in at least one attack, the ASE:
• Creates a set of attack timers TPn, each one of which
associated to one physical attack involving node n.
• Creates a set of attack timers TCn, each one of which
associated to one conditional attack involving node n.
• Creates a set of attack timers TUn, each one of which
associated to one unconditional attack involving node n.
• Starts all the timers in TPn, TCn, and TUn, in order to
schedule the respective attack’s occurrence.
Throughout the network simulation, the ASE proceeds
as follows. When an attack timer associated to a node n
expires, the ASE retrieves the associated attack A. Then:
• If A is a physical attack, the ASE executes the associated
node primitive, and removes A from the attack list LPn.
• If A is a conditional attack, from then on the ASE starts in-
tercepting packets flowing through node n’s communication
stack, by means of node n’s LPE. Intercepted packets are
filtered, based on the condition specified in the conditional
statement of attack A. For each packet that satisfies the
conditional statement, the ASE executes the list of events
described by the message primitives in A. The execution of
some node primitives may involve also the GEP as well as
the LEP modules of other nodes than n.
• If A is an unconditional attack, from then on the ASE
starts executing the corresponding list of message primitives,
and repeatedly performs A according to the occurrence fre-
quency in the attack description. The GEP is responsible for
starting the actual reproduction of uncondintional attacks.
4. Evaluation of a Denial of Service attack
In this section, we simulate a simple Denial of Service
attack against a server host, and present some preliminary
results. We refer to the scenario in Figure 4, which includes:
i) a SDN controller and a switch; and ii) four client hosts
and three server hosts, running a UDP application. Besides,
Client1 sends 10 packets per second to Server1; Client2
and Client3 send 5 and 3.33 packets per second to Server2,
respectively; Client4 sends 5 packets per second to Server3.
Each flow installed on the switch expires every 30
seconds. When this happens, the switch notifies the SDN
controller, removes the flow and possibly re-establishes it
upon receiving new packets from/to the involved host(s).
The SDN controller periodically collects flow statistics from
the switch, according to a configurable interval I . Besides,
the SDN controller runs a monitoring application that ana-
lyzes flow statistics in order to detect possible traffic anoma-
lies. In particular, it relies on: i) entropy-based techniques
for anomaly detection [12] [13]; and ii) bounded rates for
transmission/reception of packets on a single-node basis. If
traffic anomalies are detected on a given flow, the SDN con-
troller sends an OpenFlow message OFPT FLOW MOD to
the switch, in order to install a selective drop policy and
discard all packets matching with that flow until further
notice. In this scenario, we consider an adversary that has
compromised Client3, and exploits it to transmit additional
network packets to Server2, starting from time t = 90 s,
and according to a packet injection rate R.
Figure 4: Evaluated SDN network scenario.
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Figure 5: Packet reception on Server2 (I=30 s).
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Figure 6: Packet reception on Server2 (R=40 pkts/s).
Figures 5 and 6 show the packet reception on Server2,
considering the attack-free case “No attack” as baseline.
A value plotted at second t = s indicates the number of
packets overall received by Server2 during the last second,
i.e. between t = s − 1 and t = s. Specifically, Figure 5
considers different injection rates R, and shows that the
greater R the more (attack) packets are received by Server2,
until the traffic anomaly is mitigated at t = 120 s. From then
on, the switch discards all packets coming from Client3 and
addressed to Server2. Figure 6 considers different statistic
collection intervals I , and shows the different times that it
takes to detect and mitigate the attack, depending on the
interval I considered by the SDN controller.
5. Conclusion
We have presented our extensions to the INET frame-
work to support the evaluation of performance and security
attacks in SDN scenarios. Our extensions allow the user to
evaluate performance of a SDN architecture, assess accuracy
and reactiveness of SDN-based monitoring systems, and
quantitatively evaluate the impact of security attacks. We
have evaluated a simple Denial of Service attack, and pre-
sented preliminary results. This work is an ongoing research
activity, and we plan to propose it for an official contribution
to the INET framework. Future work will focus on evaluat-
ing different classes of security attacks, considering different
SDN-based monitoring systems and adversary models.
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